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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal challenges the lower court’s grant 0f Plaintiff’s Motion for Judgment 0n the

Pleadings, ﬁled

by Noah G.

Hillen,

(hereafter “Hillen”) acting in his capacity as personal

representative of the Estate 0f Victoria H. Smith, (hereafter “Victoria” 0r “Decedent”). Hillen

sought ejectment 0f Defendant—Appellant, David R. Gibson ((hereafter “Gibson”), from property
that

Gibson has possessed since 2004, possession with authorization from the former owner,

Victoria,

and express authorization from Vernon K. Smith (hereafter “Vernon”) and

his continued

possession since Victoria’s death 0n September 11, 2013, pursuant t0 Vernon’s 2/3rds ownership

an heir of Victoria’s

interest as

assets.

The judgment was based upon
his Complaint, as “ownership”

is

Highway Dist. V Total Success
it

Hillen’s alleged exclusive titled ownership of the property in

a ﬁmdamental element to any

Investments,

LLC, 145 Idaho

ej ectment

action.

See Ada County

360, 179 P.3d 323 (2008), wherein

holds that “Ejectment requires proof of (1) ownership, (2) possession by the defendants, and

(3) refusal

of the defendants to surrender possession.

Hillen’s “ownership” claim

was challenged by Gibson and Vernon Within Gibson’s

responsive pleadings, as a personal representative (PR), acting in a ﬁduciary capacity, can never be
the titled

owner of a Decedent’s

property, as a matter 0f law, since the

(UPC) places ownership immediately upon death with

Uniform Probate Code

the heirs or devisees, vesting titled

ownership and right t0 possession, subject only t0 administration 0f the estate by the ﬁduciary,

empowered
satisfaction

to take possession

0f

creditors’ claims

from the heirs or devisees upon showing 0f a necessity for the
and other interested persons (mortgagees 0r Trust Deed holders),

Appellant’s Opening Brief
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and absent such claims 0r

interests,

n0 authority

Will authorize a ﬁduciary to

become a

“titled

owner” 0f Decedent’s property.

B.
This action was

COURSE 0F PROCEEDINGS BELOW

commenced by

(C1. R. pp.7-27), seeking t0 eject

pretext Hillen

was

Gibson from possession of the

the exclusive titled

Answer and Demand

Hillen the personal representative (PR) on June 7, 2019,

for Jury Trial

owner of Decedent’s
0n July

2019

5,

Gowen

Field property,

upon

the

property. In response, Gibson ﬁled his

(C1. R. pp. 28-52),

denying the claim of

ownership, setting forth a factual and legal basis that challenged Hillen’s claim.

On
Count

I,

August

5,

2019, Hillen ﬁled Motion for Partial Judgment 0n the Pleadings, regarding

requesting ejectment of Gibson from that portion of the 520—acre parcel he had possessed

“Gowen

since 2004, called the

Field” property, comprising one of Decedent’s assets. Hillen

requested the judgment be certiﬁed for appeal
53-55). Hillen submitted his

Which Gibson presented

memorandum

his opposition

(if entered)

(C1. R. pp.

under Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P.

(C1. R. pp.

56-65) and Declaration (C1. R. pp. 66-85), t0

on September

2019

12,

R. pp. 86-108) with Hillen’s

(C1.

reply submitted September 16, 2019 (C1. R. pp. 109-1 16).

The matter was

heard, and

0n October

2,

2019, the lower court issued a Decision and Order

granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Judgment on the Pleadings (C1. R. pp. 117-125), issuing a

Certiﬁed Judgment under Rule 54(b), I.R.C.P.

(C1.

R. pp. 126-128).

On October 3, 2019, the court ﬁled its Amended Decision (C1.
Gibson moved

t0

Amend the Judgment

I.R.C.P. (C1. R. pp. 147-150), supported

0f October 2 0n October

by Gibson’s memorandum

While Gibson’s Motion was pending, Hillen ﬁled
16,

20 1 9

(C1. R. pp. 15

1

-1 59),

14,

R. pp. 129-146), from which

2019, pursuant to Rule 59(6),

(C1. R. pp. 188-206).

for Attorney Fees

and Costs 0n October

ﬁling his Declaration (C1. R. pp. 160- 1 7 1 ), t0 Which Gibson

Appellant’s Opening Brief
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moved

to

Disallow fees and costs 0n October 29, 2019

Hillen’s

Memorandum

for Fees

Motion to Disallow on November

The lower

December

6,

(C1.

R. pp. 207-21

any decision 0n fees and costs
the

15,

2019

until

1),

(C1.

174-184). Hillen responded to Gibson’s

R. pp. 185-1 87).

denying the Motion t0

0n

Amend Judgment,

Judgment and Decision denying Gibson’s Motion

(C1. R. pp.

On January

(C1. R. pp.

to

Amend, Gibson ﬁled

his

212-216), identifying the Decisi0n(s) and

217—252) appealed from, and taken to

14,

and Withholding

ﬁnal judgment, vacating the scheduled hearing.

Notice of Appeal 0n December 31, 2019

Judgment

(C1. R. pp.

court considered the motions, without hearing, issuing a Decision and Order

2019

From

and Costs

(C1. R. pp. 172-173), citing authority to defeat

this appellate court.

2020, Hillen sought to augment the record (C1. R. pp. 253-255), Which has

been prepared and submitted

t0 this court (Cl. R. pp. 256-259).

C.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Factual Background

This independent proceeding arises out of the probate controversy within the Estate 0f
Victoria H. Smith. In the probate, the magistrate determined Victoria’s February

Holographic Will was invalid as a result of undue inﬂuence, and also
Victoria’s property to

the transfer

was an

VHS

act

Properties,

LLC

that occurred July 4, 2012.

14,

1990

set aside transfers

0f

The magistrate concluded

0f “gifting”, about which the court declared the power lacked authority

t0

conduct “gifting”. Those disputed ﬁndings were upheld by the Idaho Supreme Court as reﬂected In
re Estate

omeith, 164 Idaho 457, 466, 432 P.3d

T0

effectuate

return

Order/Judgment 0n June
to the statute

2,

15 (2018).

of property to Decedent, the magistrate issued a Rule 70(b)

2017 vesting

and case law

6,

title

and ownership

t0 the property With the

that declares heirs or devisees

PR, contrary

immediately vested With

title

upon

Decedent’s death, not with the estate or any ﬁduciary (PR). This Order/Judgment was relied upon

Appellant’s Opening Brief
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in Hillen’s

memorandum

supporting his motion, the content of which Instrument Hillen concluded

of Decedent’s property with him, and not the heirs of the Decedent,

placed ownership

notwithstanding the statute and case law.

Gibson had been

compost and humus

0f a small portion 0f the 520 acres, producing

in continuous possession

be utilized on the entire 520

to

possession since 2004, With the agreement of Victoria,

acres.

who

VHS

held

title

t0 the property

from July

Gibson possessed

2012

4,

that portion

Properties,

June

until the

2,

in continuous

died 9 years later on September 11,

who became

2013, along With the express agreement with Vernon,
property assets, along with the agreement from

Gibson had been

2/3rds heir of Victoria’s

LLC,

(hereafter

“VHS”)

that

2017 Rule 70(b) Order/Judgment.

0f the property t0 produce the compost and humus for the

IDAPA

property, in ﬁlll compliance With the applicable

rules

controversy with the Department 0f Environmental Quality

and regulations, following the

(DEQ) and the afﬁrmed Decision.

Gibson’s possession continued under his agreement With Victoria and Vernon, and t0 protect
Gibson’s

interest,

interests, as the

following Hillen’s

PR was

acres, pursuant to the

ﬂawed

claims,

aware Vernon was the

Vernon became counsel

2/3rds

vested

and

titled

to protect

owner

Uniform Probate Code and case law, and well knew

t0 the entire

title

P. 222, (1919), unaffected

by any Rule 70(b) Order 0f a

520

could not be

placed with a PR, as a matter of law, as declared by the well-established law in Idaho,

Lemp, 32 Idaho 397, 184

Gibson’s

Lemp

v.

magistrate.

Hillen chose t0 pursue a confrontational course 0f action With Vernon, engaging in
litigation that has

activity,

been deemed by Vernon

pursuing irresponsible attempts to

required under the

UPC,

as there

were no

to

be immensely wasteful and non-productive

sell

property in the absence 0f any necessity as

creditors

and

all

Appellant’s Opening Brief
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Vernon’s frustration with the PR’s behavior has been the disregard of the PR’s ﬁduciary
duty that he

is

t0 preserve the assets

0f the Decadent, and only

Which there were none) and no other
and Vernon’s 2/3““
distributed in-kind,

interest, as

interest required

sell assets to satisfy creditors

any liquidation, as

to

that portion

would be

taxes were paid,

an heir and owner of the entire assets of Victoria, must be

and not foolishly liquidated, and creating a

good reason

all

(0f

capital gains tax,

having every

oppose removal of Gibson from that portion of property Gibson possessed, as
distributed to Vernon.

Gibson had produced approximately 350,000

cu.

yds 0f compost and humus, stored upon the property intended for use upon the entire 520 acres,
a decades’ long development plan for the application 0f the compost and

activities

envisioned by Victoria, Vernon, and Gibson for their agricultural

Gibson has been a signiﬁcant
protect

humus

the

property

asset t0 both Victoria

for agricultural

activities.

and Vernon, as Gibson served

t0

and the environment, and ultimately eliminated the dumping and

accumulation 0f debris that otherwise was deposited onto portions 0f the 520 acres in prior
years.

For many years, people were trespassing upon the property and depositing

materials, seen to

them

as a “free”

dump

site,

their

unwanted

but with Gibson’s presence, the matter was

signiﬁcantly reduced and curtailed entirely With his daily presence and caretaking efforts

stemming from

The

his

area,

compost operational

commonly

Front Area, had become a
discarded motor

oils,

activities since

referred t0

dump

site for

wood, metal,

2004.

by Vernon and

his Father, as the

Gowen

Field Desert

discarded animal carcasses, waste petroleum products,

glass

and assorted construction

fragments of concrete ﬂatwork removal, rocks, brush, trash,

tires,

debris, concrete blocks,

contaminates and hazardous

wastes 0f various types. Gibson brought a complete stop t0 this dumping process, confronting
those

who

chose t0 regard

this

property as an inexpensive alternative t0 delivering their debris
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to the

Ada County

landﬁll, as prior to Gibson’s presence, there

dump, and Gibson’s presence eliminated

the access to

Gibson stopped

commenced

this

this

was n0 fence

t0 limit 0r control

unlawful conduct.

accumulation, a tremendous beneﬁt to Victoria and Vernon, and

the production of

compost and humus and maintaining

his daily presence there,

operating the compost production and providing eliminating any liability from ﬁre and

environmental contamination, While producing the compost and humus required for the long

planned improvements for the property, important t0 Victoria and Vernon’s continuing best
While annually preserving the agricultural tax allowances

interests,

agricultural

operations reﬂected

the

by

stemming from the

composting operations and grazing

accordance With the statewide permitted agricultural use reﬂected by the Right
the Soil

and Plant Amendment Act contained

in Title 22, Chapters

This agriculturally based tax allowance was
sell their

Vernon’s

status in the estate is

embraced by well-established case law,

in

Farm Act and

22 and 45, Idaho Code.

critical t0 Victoria,

shared interest in the property, a decision to be

t0

activities,

made by the

and an heir

heir,

may

elect t0

not by the PR.

an owner—heir of Decadent, pursuant t0 LC. §15-3-101,
statutorily

mandated

to

be a vested and

titled

owner, being

the 2/3rds heir of Victoria’s assets. There are substantial property assets in Decedent’s estate to

allow in—kind distribution as mandated by the

Vernon’s possessory

interest

statute,

and Gibson’s presence will remain under

through his ownership t0 the 2/3““ 0f the entire 520 acres, and Gibson

has never been an unlawful detainer, and n0 beneﬁt t0 the heirs would be served by his ejectment,
as

Gibson

whom the
limits the

retains possession through

statute

PR

Vernon’s ownership

and case law supports Vernon’s

titled

t0 take possession only t0 the extent

interest

and

statutory possession, t0

ownership and possession, and the

needed

t0 satisﬁz creditors 0r other interested

persons, 0f which there are none, and no factual basis supports otherwise.

Appellant’s Opening Brief
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Hillen’s desire to sell

all

property remains entirely unnecessary, and Hillen had n0

authority t0 take possession to liquidate property that appears to beneﬁt

creditors, as

Vernon resolved

Victoria’s death in 2013, with

all

claims and

n0 assistance from

the Intestate disposition currently in place

Vernon has vigorously opposed
properties,

and Hillen

satisfy creditors)

is

liabilities

by the

someone other than

of both his Father and Mother long before

his brother, Joseph, the remaining 1/3rd heir

under

controversial actions 0f the magistrate.

Hillen’s attempt to take possession of these remaining

acting Without any supporting legal authority (necessity to sell property t0

under the applicable provisions 0f the UPC, but instead a strained construction 0f

the misplaced Rule 70(b) Order/Judgment of the magistrate.

In the absence 0f necessity arising out 0f the administration of the estate for the beneﬁt of

creditors or other interested persons,

LC.

§

15-3-71

distribution of Decedent’s assets to the heirs, as

I.C. § 15-3-906.

PR

Actions taken by a

1,

the

opposed

in excess

by an order of the

court,

LC.

Pleadings, asserting he

to liquidation

0f Decedent’s property.

§

result in a breach

of

15-3-712, and will be properly be

§ 15-3-607.

Hillen’s Proceedings

Hillen, after ﬁling his

prefers and promotes in—kind

of a PR’s authon'ty Will

ﬁduciary duty remediable by an award 0f damages, LC.
restrained

UPC

Complaint

T0 Eiectment

to eject Gibson,

0f Gibson

ﬁled for Partial Judgment 0n the

was owner ofDecedent’s property, and

for that reason, entitled t0 all

rights, as the

owner, to do What he wants With the property, arguing that Vernon, though a

2/3rds heir of

all

assets of Victoria,

was n0 longer an

interested

owner of the

Rule 70(b) Order, and Vernon had no say in the process of any
relied entirely

upon

the magistrate’s Rule 70(b) Order and

Appellant’s Opening Brief
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assets

of the property.

Judgment entered June

P. 12

under the

2,

2017.

Hillen

Vernon had been Gibson’s counsel
facts regarding this property

and Gibson’s possessory

to bring his ejectment action against

owner 0f the property,

in other matters,

as only heirs

and knowledgeable 0f the

interests, believing Hillen lacks

Gibson upon any claim Hillen was a

0f the decedent

historical

are, not a

titled

standing

and vested

PR, as a ﬁduciary cannot hold

ownership of a Decedent’s property. Hillen has never sought a right t0 claim a need for
possession for any factually based purpose, as there are none.

D.
The

STANDARD OF REVIEW

issues raised in this appeal regard whether a factual-lawful basis exists, as a matter 0f

law, Within the allegations 0f the complaint t0 grant judgment 0n the pleadings in this controversy

under Hillen’s claim he
0f

civil

is

the exclusive titled

owner 0f the

property, necessitating review 0f rules

procedure, the statutes, and their interpretation, t0 determine in what manner Hillen’s

allegation he

is

the titled and vested

owner 0f Decedent’s property

case law to grant his motion, as his “ownership”

is

is

supported by the statute and

based upon a Rule 70(b) Order 0f the

magistrate, entered in contradiction of the statutory provisions 0f the

upon which

magistrate jurisdictional powers. These are questions of law

exercises

free review.

"[t]his

application to the facts."

St.

Luke's Reg'l Med.

with respect to statutory interpretation,

86,

was

stated in

St.

C274, Ltd. v.

this issue is

this

0f a

in excess

this appellate court

Bd. 0f Comm'rs

ofAda

its

146

Cnly.,

appeal presents a question of law, and

recognized t0 be one of free review, as that

Alphonsus Regional Medical Center

356 P.3d 377, 379 (2015), and previously addressed

in

v.

Gooding County, 159 Idaho

Ada County Highway

Success Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 179 P.3d 323 (2008), stating
court's decision involves

and

Court freely reviews the interpretation of a statute and

Idaho 753, 755, 203 P.3d 683, 685 (2009). Because

standard

UPC

entwined questions 0f law and
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we

Dist.

V

84,

Total

“When review of a

trial

exercise free review over

questions 0f law, and uphold factual ﬁndings supported

citing

by

substantial

and competent evidence.”,

Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675, 679, 946 P.2d 975, 979 (1997).

The process of statutory construction and
Court, as general rule, in Hoﬂer

v.

“The objective 0f
intent.”

“When
.”

State

v.

interpretation

was summarized by

the

Supreme

Shappard, 160 Idaho 870, 380 P.3d 681 (2016):
statutory interpretation is t0 give effect t0 legislative

Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 475, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187 (2007).

interpreting a statute, the Court begins With the literal

words 0f the

statute.

.

.

Blue Cross ofldaho, 151 Idaho 515, 521, 260 P.3d 1186, 1192 (201 1).
“If the statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent 0f the
Williams

v.

Idaho Youth Ranch, Inc. v. Ada Cnty. Bd.
0f Equalization, 157 Idaho 180, 184-85, 335 P.3d 25, 29-30 (2014) (internal
quotations omitted) (quoting St. Luke’s Reg’ l Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Bd. 0f Comm ’rs 0f
legislative

Ada

body must be given

effect.

Cnly., 146 Idaho 753, 755,

.”

.

.

203 P.3d 683, 685 (2009)).

This Court does not

have the authority t0 modify an unambiguous legislative enactment. Verska v. Saint
Alphonsus Reg’ lMed. Cm, 151 Idaho 889, 895, 265 P.3d 502, 508 (201 1) (quoting
Berry v. Koehler, 84 Idaho 170, 177, 369 P.2d 1010, 1013 (1962)).
160 Idaho

at

884, 380 P.3d at 695.

Issues addressed in a

Motion

for

Judgment on the Pleadings

is

controlled

by Rule

12(c)&(d), IRCP, and facts considered outside the actual pleadings invokes Rule 56, IRCP.

Rule 12(0) IRCP, addresses such Motions as follows:
“After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the

may move

trial,

any

on a motion for judgment on the
party
pleadings, matters outside the pleadings are presented t0 and not excluded by the
court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present
all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56”

When

for judgment

on the pleadings.

If

an appellate court reviews a decision entered upon a summary proceeding, the

appellate Court

employs the same standard as the

district court.

Farmers National Bank

Green River Dairy, LLC, 155 Idaho 853, 318 P3d 622 (2014); Cnly. ofBoise
Risk Mgmt. Program, Underwriters, 151 Idaho 901, 904, 265 P.3d 514, 517 (201

A judgment upon

the pleadings results

when

the

any material allegations offhe complaint. See Alspaugh

v.
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Idaho Cnlys.

1)..

answer does not putforth cm issue as
Reid, 6 Idaho 223, 55 P. 300;

P.

14

v.

Coombs

t0

v.

Collins, 6 Idaho 536,

v.

57

P. 310; Mills Novelty C0.

v.

Burke, 27 Idaho 464 149 P. 511 (1915); and Jones

1161 (1986).
the pleadings

In Hicks

is

v.

Lovell,

64 Cal.

14,

Dunbar, 11 Idaho 671, 83
v.

P. 932;

Davenport

City ofSt. Maries, 111 Idaho 733,

49 Am. Rep. 679, 27

P. 942,

it

727 P.2d

was held Judgment on

authorized “where the answer admits 0r leaves undenied the material facts stated in

the complaint."

When

a case

is

decided upon a motion on the pleadings, for the purpose of any appeal of

that decision, the appellate court

citing

Davenport

Idaho 21

1,

v.

must accept as true the appellants

allegations. See, Jones, supra,

Burke, 27 Idaho 464, 473, 149 P. 511, 515 (1915). In Sterling

723 P.2d 755 (1986), the court held

that

motion for judgment on the pleadings, pursuant
allegations

'

where the

district court

v.

Bloom, 111

decided the case on a

moving party admits

to I.R.C.P. 12(0), the

all

0f the opposing party's pleadings, and concomitantly, admits the untruth 0f its own

allegations which has been denied, citing to Davenport

In Smith

v.

Smith,

ez‘

al,

v.

Burke, supra (1915).

160 Idaho 780, 379 P.3d 1048 (2016), the Court held:

"I.R.C.P. 12(0) governs motions for

judgment on the pleadings.

By

its

terms, Rule

summary judgment. Thus, the
rulings on motions for summary

12(0) treats such motions similarly t0 motions for

standard of review applicable to lower courts'

judgment

also applies to motions for

judgment on the pleadings." Trimble

v.

Engelking, 130 Idaho 300, 302, 939 P.2d 1379, 1381 (1997).

The Supreme Court

will review a

judgment on the pleadings

reviews summary judgment proceedings. Bowles

v.

Pro

in the

same manner

Indiviso, Ina, 132 Idaho 371, 374,

as

it

973

P.2d 142, 145 (1999). In reviewing a summary judgment, the appellate Court employs the same
review used by the

trial

court in ruling

on the motion. Union Paciﬁc Land Resources Corp.

v.

Shoshone County Assessor, 140 Idaho 528, 531, 96 P.3d 629, 632 (2004).

Summary judgment
and

that the

moving patty

is

is

proper only

when there

entitled t0 a judgment as

is

n0 genuine issue as

t0

any material

fact

a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c). The party
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moving

for

summary judgment

carries the

judgment as a matter 0f law. Eliopulos
(Ct.App.1992). See also Coghlan

313 (1999). See also

P3d 1204

Hap

(2014), Golub

P.3d 893 (2015); Sims

Taylor

v.

9,

&

Sons,

Houpt

v.

LLC v VP Ina,

v.

Summerwind
(Supreme

Partners,

LLC, 157 Idaho

Ct. January 30,

ownership 0fDecedent’s
title

600, 338

2015 N0. 41505), 342

Ina, (Idaho Supreme Court N0. 41269, January 21,

Wells

Fargo Bank, N.A. (Supreme Court N0. 41990),

Inc. et al ,162

Sagecrest Multi

v.

Idaho 317, 396 P.3d 1199 (2017); Valiant

164 Idah0,314, 429 P.3d 855 (2018).

In this action, the analysis

with both

issue and entitled to

2016, 2016 Opinion N0. 28, 370 P.3d 384 (2016); Forbush et al

Family Properly Owners ’Association,
Idaho,

no genuine

Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 401, 987 P.2d 300,

ACI Northwest,

v.

t0 establish

Knox, 123 Idaho 400, 404, 848 P.2d 984, 988

v.

Kirk-Scott, Ltd,

2015), 342 P.3d 618 (2015);

March

v.

burden

assets; as

is

the application 0f law t0 the issue

it is

0f

titled

and

vested

the heirs, not the PR, as statutorily declared t0 be vested

and possession. This appellate court must decide Whether a PR, Who claims

“ownership” has a right to

sell

property as the “owner”, based upon an erroneous and controversial

Rule 70(b) Order entered by a magistrate 0n June

2,

2017, and whether such an Order will ever be

allowed t0 defeat the statutory rights of the heirs?

LEGAL STANDARD APPLICABLE TO A MOTION TO AMEND
In

Noreen

P.3d 129, 132-33

v.

Price Development C0. Limited Partnership, 135 Idaho 816, 819-820, 25

(Ct.

App. 2001) the Court of Appeals addressed the purpose and distinctions

between a motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory judgment, as provided by I.R.C.P.
11.2(b),

and a motion for reconsideration

t0

amend

a ﬁnal judgment under Rule 59(6), I.R.C.P..

In this matter the entry 0f this Rule 54(b) Certiﬁcate renders this

reconsideration

w

amendment under

judgment ﬁnal

I.R.C.P. 59(6). Idaho First Nat’l
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for purposes 0f

Bank v. David Steed

&

Assoc, Ina, 121 Idaho 356, 361, 825 P.2d 79, 84 (1992).
In City ofPocatello

State ofldaho, 152 Idaho 830, 275 P.3d 845 (2012), the Court

v.

explained the function served by a motion t0 reconsider a ﬁnal judgment under Rule 59(6):

“The purpose of motions under

that rule is ‘to allow the trial court

.

.

.

to

had occurred in its proceedings.’
Consideration of I.R.C.P. 59(6) motions must be directed t0 the status of the case
as it existed when the court rendered the decision upon which the judgment is
based.” First Sec. Bank ofldaho, N.A. v. Webster, 119 Idaho 262, 266, 805 P.2d
468, 472 (1991) (citations omitted). “A Rule 59(6) motion may not be used t0
correct errors both of fact and law that

raise

arguments or present evidence for the ﬁrst time when they could reasonably

have been raised earlier in the litigation.” Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate ofBishop,
229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir.2000); accord Exxon Shipping C0. v. Baker, 554 U.S.
471, 486, 128 S. Ct. 2605, 2617, 171 L.Ed.2d 570, 581-82 (2008); 11 C. Wright
& A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810.1, pp. 127-28 (2d ed. 1995);

47 Am.Jur.2d Judgments

new

information that the

§

658 (2006).

trial

Such motion cannot be used

court did not have before

it

rendered

its

to present

judgment.

749 P.2d 486, 489 (1988). A Rule 59(6)
and offer evidence that, in hindsight, the
litigant Wishes it would have presented prior t0 the entry of a ﬁnal judgment. 152
Idaho at 837, 275 P.3d at 852.

Marcher

v.

Butler, 113 Idaho 867, 870,

motion cannot be used

A motion t0
denial

is

Pandrea

reconsider under Rule 59(6)

is

addressed t0 the discretion 0f the court and

appealable upon the question of Whether there has been an abuse of discretion.

v.

Barrett, 160 Idaho 165, 171,

II.

1.

t0 raise issues

369 P.3d 943, 949 (2016).

ISSUES PRESENTED

ON APPEAL

In the absence of any established and demonstrated need for the liquidation of assets
in the administration

of an

estate, as

determined under

I.

C. §15-3-71

1,

does a

personal representative have any authority within the general provisions 0f the Idaho

Uniform Probate Code, I. C. §§15-1-101 et seq. (UPC), to eject a venture participant
(Appellant Gibson) from his otherwise lawful possession of property that by law (I.
C. §15-3-101)

2.

is

vested in the heirs 0f the Estate?

a personal representative ever "own" estate property, as opposed
to taking and holding "possession" of that property in trust for the beneﬁt of

Under

the

UPC, can

creditors in satisfaction of their claims?

3.

have any authority t0 transfer "ownership"
a personal representative by means of a Rule 70(b), I.R.C.P. order?

Does a magistrate
0f property t0

in a probate proceeding

Appellant’s Opening Brief
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Does

announced in I. C. §15-3-709 apply to a
personal representative's pleading, made upon alleged "ownership" of property, as
opposed t0 a pleading t0 obtain "possession" 0f property, for satisfaction of creditor
claims as an estate administration necessity, t0 which the "conclusive evidence"
standard was intended to apply under that section?

4.

the "conclusive evidence" standard

ON APPEAL RAISED ON GIBSON’S MOTION TO
AMEND JUDGMENT, AS AMONG THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
ISSUES

Was

2019 Amended Memorandum decision based upon
a speciﬁc ﬁnding that Hillen is the sole owner of the Gowen Field property — and all
0f Decedent’s property — as a direct consequence 0f the entry 0f the Rule 70(b)

5.

the lower court’s October 3,

Order?
Alternatively, did this Court’s decision constitute a direct repudiation

and denial 0f
Hillen’s claim t0 be the “sole owner” 0f Decedent’s property as a result of the Rule
70(b) Order on the basis this Court has instead declared Hillen t0 have the “same
power” as that 0f an absolute owner under LC. § 15-3-711, as being necessary t0

6.

permit

Him t0

ej ect

deemed

Gibson from the

Gowen

Field property?

be the sole owner 0f Decedent’s property, as a consequence 0f
70(b) Order, then 0n What basis does Hillen remain subject t0 the
statutorily—stated trust obligations he owes t0 Decedent’s heir whose interest has

If Hillen is

7.

t0

the Rule

been allegedly divested as

0f the entry of the Rule 70(b) Order?

be the sole owner of Decedent’s property as a consequence 0f
the Rule 70(b) Order, then on What basis does the “divested” heir, Vernon K. Smith,
retain standing t0 challenge or seek restraint of the unauthorized actions attempted
by Hillen t0 sell the heirs’ property without a clear showing of necessity which
If Hillen is

8.

becomes a
9.

deemed

result

t0

factual dispute?

Whether Gibson is entitled t0 an award of costs, and preserve the
fees, should Gibson prevail on this appeal?
III.

On

issue 0f attorney

ARGUMENT PRESENTED ON THESE ISSUES ON APPEAL

October

3,

2019, the lower Court issued the

Amended Memorandum

Decision (C1.

R. pp. 129-146) granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Judgment 0n the Pleadings, wherein the

lower Court acknowledged the basis for Hillen’s motion was founded upon his asserted claim as
“sole

owner” 0f Decedent’s property, but despite such an acknowledgement, never declared

Hillen, in fact,

was

the sole

owner of Decedent’s Property

Appellant’s Opening Brief
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that

Rule

70(b) Order. This appellate court has both judicial notice of the Rule 70(b) Order, identiﬁed in
the

Supreme Court Decision In re Estate 0f Smith, 164 Idaho 457, 432 P.3d 6 (2018), and

made part of this

record (C1. R. pp. 17-21 and again at 137-145).

In addition t0 the Court’s statement, as

6 0f

its

Amended Memorandum

made

in the single full paragraph

Decision (C1. R.

p.

acres

Gowen

found 0n page

134), the Court reasoned the

conferred by LC. § 15-3-711 was adequate t0 grant Hillen’s request for an order

from the

as

ej ecting

power
Gibson

Field property, 0f Which Gibson occupied only a very small portion 0f the 520

Where he was producing compost and humus.
In the last sentence of the second full paragraph

on page 5 0f the Decision

(C1. R. p.

133), the lower Court concluded:

So contrary
“title”

t0

Gibson’s position, the fact that the statute gives a “power” instead 0f

does not matter—even Without holding

absolute

title, Hillen would still have the power of an
owner over the Gowen Property, Which includes determining who can occupy it.

Amended Memo.

Dec., p. 5, C1. R. p.133) (bold/underlined emphasis added).

Gibson and

his counsel

Vernon, a statutory heir to 2/3rds 0f the Decedent’s

strong exception t0 the lower Court’s statement that

is

it

assets, take

simply “does not matter” whether Hillen

determined t0 be an “owner” 0f property, or determined only to a right t0 “possession” 0f the

property,

upon demonstrating a

over that property,
heirs

When

clear necessity that did not exist, regarding a grant 0f a

the exercise of a

power

is

limited

by

“power”

Hillen’s trust obligations to the

under the Uniform Probate Code (UPC).
This false premise Hillen has relied upon (ownership) for an order of ejectment, under

his complaint

interests,

and

and motion for judgment upon the pleadings, claims “ownership” 0f the property
this

false

premises will wrongfully be relied upon by Hillen in subsequent

proceedings in Which the distinction between “ownership” and a claimed right to “possession”
Will be highly signiﬁcant t0 the determination 0f the particular cause then presented.
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Gibson has argued within
arise out

heirs,

motion

to

amend

Judgment

the

that signiﬁcant distinctions

of the statutory limitations placed upon the exercise 0f a “power” by a personal

representative, as

property.

his

opposed

is

free t0

d0 With

were due When they were
activity despite limitations

If Hillen

that property as

fully paid

he pleases,

and no creditors

imposed upon

is

the sole “owner” of Decedent’s

owner”, to the exclusion of any trust interest in the

If Hillen is declared the “sole

then he

he

t0 Hillen’s ﬁctitious claim

his actions

by

like

obligation t0 the heirs, nor

would he remain

doing here, claiming taxes

the

UPC.
t0 the exclusion

n0 longer would be subject

0f Decedent’s

to the statutory trust

subj ect t0 the heirs’ corresponding statutory right t0

restrain his unauthorized actions (LC. § 15-3-607), 0r

seek damages for Hillen’s breach of his ﬁduciary duty

These contentions would be a defense
Decedent’s property, as the heirs’

is

existed, arrogantly seeking unrestricted

were the “sole owner” 0f Decedent’s property,

heirs as statutorily mandated, then Hillen

he

if

an heirs’ statutorily authorized right t0

(I.C. § 15-3-712),

Hillen were

deemed

Which he has done.

t0

trust interest effectively extinguished,

be the sole owner of

and the heirs would no

longer have the standing to seek an order 0f restraint against Hillen, or seek

damages

for his

breach 0f ﬁduciary duty, inasmuch as those statutory obligations would be eliminated by the
effects

of the lower court’s erroneous Order, and the Rule 70(b) Order.
In contrast t0 ownership, Hillen could only seek possession t0 consider a sale that

beneﬁts the
possession,

heirs, as there is

it is

only in

no tax due and there are no

trust, for

1

is

misplaced. See,

must

This appeal requires the court to engage in statutory

In addition, Gibson does also observe the lower court’s reliance

15-3-709

Should he receive

the beneﬁt of creditors and other interested persons, and

otherwise protect the interests 0f the heirs.

1

creditors t0 satisfy.

Amended Memorandum Decision

upon

the “conclusive evidence” standard of LC. §
R. p. 133. That statutory conclusive

at pg. 5, C1.

evidence standard is only intended to apply t0 a personal representative’s claim t0 the “possession” 0f the
Decedent’s property — not t0 a claim t0 the “ownership” 0f the property. Hillen’s claim has been based solely upon
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interpretation, t0 determine the issue

0f ownership 0f a Decedent’s

assets, as that issue is raised in

the pleadings, and announced in well-established case law, rejecting Hillen’s claim t0 ownership,

denied by Gibson and the 2/3rds

Decedent’s assets

and

is

heir,

and the proper statutory interpretation of “ownership” of a

squarely at issue. This appellate court must detennine whether the Legislature

this well-established case

law 0n the issue 0f ownership ever authorized such ownership

personal representative, and for this court to determine in what manner

397, 184 P. 222, (1919)

Because

this

is

now to be

Lemp

v.

in a

Lemp, 32 Idaho

applied differently.

appeal requires the court apply the law in respect t0 the statutory ownership 0f

a Decedent’s property, this court must engage statutory interpretation, and such issues are treated

under the standard of free review, as recently addressed in

v.

Gooding County, 159 Idaho

84, 86,

Alphonsus Regional Medical Center

St.

356 P.3d 377, 379 (2015). There are several recent appellate

court rulings on statutory construction and interpretation,

interpretation has

681 (2016),

been sufﬁciently summarized

Hoﬂer

v.

Shappard, 160 Idaho 870, 380 P.3d

stating:

“The objective 0f statutory
v.

in

and the general rule 0f statutory

interpretation is t0 give effect to legislative intent.” State

“When

Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 475, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187 (2007).

interpreting

.”

Williams v. Blue
statute, the Court begins With the literal words 0f the statute.
Cross ofldaho, 151 Idaho 515, 521, 260 P.3d 1186, 1192 (2011). “If the statutory

a

.

.

language is unambiguous, the clearly expressed intent of the legislative body must
.” Idaho Youth Ranch, Inc. v. Ada
be given effect.
Cnly. Bd. oquualization, 157
Idaho 180, 184-85, 335 P.3d 25, 29-30 (2014) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
St. Luke’s Reg’ l Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Bd. 0f Comm’rs ofAda Cnly., 146 Idaho 753,
.

.

755, 203 P.3d 683, 685 (2009)).

an unambiguous

This Court does not have the authority to modify

legislative enactment.

Verska

v.

Saint Alphonsus Reg’ lMed.

151 Idaho 889, 895, 265 P.3d 502, 508 (2011) (quoting Berry

v.

Cm,

Koehler, 84 Idaho

170, 177, 369 P.2d 1010, 1013(1962)). 160 Idaho at 884, 380 P.3d at 695.

his alleged right to

“ownership” 0f Decedent’s property, not based upon a mere right t0 seek the “possession”.

A

question arises Whether that statute has any application t0 the decision 0f this matter as based upon a claim 0f

ownership instead of possession. In a larger sense,

it is

the application 0f the

restrictions they provide concerning the unauthorized actions

UPC

statutes,

and the remedies and

0f a personal representative, Which

Gibson’s controversy and appeal, a fundamental concern t0 the 2/3rds
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is at

the center 0f

The Supreme Court Decision In Re Estate 0meith, 164 Idaho 457, 432 P.3d 6 (2018) Did Not
Conﬁrm — And Was Without Authoritv T0 Conﬁrm — Hillen As The Sole Lawful Owner Of
The Decedent’s Assets
Hillen’s

Motion

of Hillen’s objective to eject Gibson from his possession of

Gowen

Field property, Where Gibson has generated compost and

of the

that small portion

humus With

arises out

Vernon

the intent t0 apply that product onto the entire 520 acres.

is

a 2/3rds

owner

of all assets 0f the Decedent, pursuant to the provisions of the UPC, and Vernon wants Gibson
to

remain 0n that portion of the property, as an in-kind distribution would place Gibson’s

presence Within Vernon’s 2/3rds share 0f the property. The Complaint ﬁled by Hillen, seeking

Gibson’s ejectment, was pursued as a “necessary condition” t0 the PR’S intended desire t0

and liquidate the

Gowen

PR is

The

Field property.

currently attempting t0 sell the

Property (520 acres), but Hillen says, as a practical matter, he cannot

such sale while Defendant stays there.” Partial Judgment
t0 address the fact

Gibson has been a signiﬁcant

prospective buyer with

Whom

an heir

may

asset,

Memo,

not a

The only

objective, as undertaken

Decedent’s property, was intended to restore
undertaken 0n June

As

development

the heirs or t0 any

exemption remains a
is

a future event.

the magistrate, for purposes 0f administration 0f

title

to Victoria,

when

the act 0f the magistrate

was

2017 with the issuance of the Rule 70(b) Order/Judgment.

this court is

essential element t0

issue.

2,

p. 7; C1. R. p. 64). Hillen fails

elect t0 contact, as the tax

by

Field

“move forward With any

liability, either t0

crucial issue t0 preserve the current agricultural operation, as

Gowen

sell

eminently aware, in any action for ejectment, the ﬁrst, fundamental, an

be alleged and proven

See Ada County Highway Dist.

P.3d 323 (2008), wherein

it

V

is

that Plaintiff has

“ownership” 0f the property

Total Success Investments,

LLC, 145 Idaho

at

360, 179

holds that “Ejectment requires proof 0f (1) ownership, (2)

possession by the defendants, and (3) refusal of the defendants to surrender possession.
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Therefore, in an attempt t0 satisfy this fundamental element required in his ejectment
claim, Hillen falsely asserted he held “ownership”, in his capacity as the

Victoria H. Smith, asserting that, “the sole disputed issue before the Court

70 Judgment has 0n the ownership of the
3; C1.

R. p. 60, 2nd Par.). Here

eject Gibson, but the

Gowen

lies Hillen’s

law won’t allow him

owner 0f the property—putting

PR
is

of the Estate 0f

the effect the Rule

Property.” See, Partial Judgment

conundrum. He wants

Memo

wants

t0 sell the property,

that right to eject unless

at issue the enforceability/voidness

he can demonstrate he

owner 0f the Gowen Field property.”

is

t0

the

of the Rule 70(b) Order.

Hillen argues, as a consequence 0f the magistrate’s Rule 70(b) Order, he has
the “sole lawful

at p.

See, Partial

Judgment

Memo

become

at pp. 4—5;

C1. R. pp. 61-62).

Hillen’s argument

Supreme Court, pursuant

is

untenable, for reasons that both the lower court, and the Idaho

t0 the

UPC,

are

bound by

personal representative by the legislature over

the limited power and authority granted t0 a

title t0

Decedent’s property, as a power and

authority exists only t0 the extent necessary for the administration of that property in the

interests

0f creditors and other interestedpersons. LC. §§ 15-3-703, 15-3-709, and 15-3-71

See

“Ofﬁcial

e.g.,

rather than

title,

Comment”

as

heirs immediately

title

to

t0

LC.

§ 15-3-7 11

The personal

representative receives a ‘power,’

Decedent’s property, as a matter of law,

upon death of the decedent, conﬁrmed

Supreme Court. See Ellmaker

t0

is

vested in the devisees or

be the controlling law by the Idaho

Tabor, 160 Idaho 576, 377 P.3d 390 (2015) and Fairchild

v.

Fairchild, 147 Idaho 147, 676 P.2d 722 (1984). These cases explicitly control this issue.

statute,

which vests

“title” t0 all

property

at the

decedent’s death, conﬁrms that

and vests With the heirs and devisees upon death 0f the decedent. See
authority,

I.

Ellmaker and Fairchild, supra, expressly declare that "legal
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v.

The

title

passes t0

C. §15-3-101.

The case

title to estate

propertv

vests in the heirs 0r devisees

upon

the death of the decedent", citing further authoritative

reference t0 Colorado, another state that has adopted the

UPC,

citing Pierce

Francis, 194

v.

P.3d 505, 510 (C010. App. 2008).
Fairchild, supra,

children

....,

statement that

who
"all

all

declared “The

trial

became cotenants

became cotenants"

court had found

We

in the thirteen acres in question."

as a conclusion of law, reached

by applying

ﬁndings 0f

I.C. §

15-3-101 (decedent’s property devolves t0 his heirs

View the

existing

See LC. §15-2-103 (concerning the share 0f the decedent’s

to the

fact.

leaving as her heirs her

heirs);

law
and

at death).

“Heirs” are statutory beneﬁciaries in an “Intestate” proceeding
“devisees” are statutory beneﬁciaries in a “Testate” proceeding

(I.

(I.

C. §15-1-201(12), and

C.

statutory declaration, devolution 0f property interests vest immediately

decedent in the heirs or devisees, whichever the situation

may

§15-1-201(22).

By

upon death 0f the

be, not t0

upon any

0r

administrator, or personal representative.

Notwithstanding the magistrate’s all-encompassing language within the Rule 70(b)
Order, the effect can neither exceed, nor expand the limited scope 0f the statutory

power and

authority granted t0 a personal representative in the administration 0f a decedent’s estate, as

provided by LC. §§ 15-3-701

et seq.

and 15-3-901

et seq..

Hillen has erroneously asserted that as a result 0f the entry of the magistrate’s Rule 70(b)

Order, “any interest Vernon once had in the premises

was divested by

vested in Hillen, the current sole owner.” See, Partial Judgment
pan). This assertion

is

the Rule 7O

Memo

Judgment and

at p. 5; C1.

R. p. 62, 1“.

an aberration of the law, and such a result not only in contradiction t0 —

but has the unintended consequence 0f exceeding

—

authority of a personal representative as declared

the Idaho Legislature in

by

the express limitations placed

Appellant’s Opening Brief

P.

24

its

upon the

adoption of the

Uniform Probate Code (UPC). See

e.g.,

In the Matter ofJane

Doe II, 160

Idaho 360, 362, 372

P.3d 1106, 1108 (2016) (“‘The legislature and the legislature only, under our constitution, has
the

power

to legislate.”) (parenthetical reference added).

N0
to the

was presented

issue

for decision

— nor was any

issue actually decided

— 0n

the appeal

Idaho Supreme Court in In re Estate omeith, 164 Idaho 457, 432 P.3d 6 (2018), t0 either

eliminate the legal

the Idaho

heirs 0f

title

that passed t0 the heirs as a matter

Supreme Court declare the

any and

all title t0

bifurcated appeal

nor did

of the Rule 70(b) Order was to oust the Decedent’s

and lawful owner 0f Decedent’s property.

issues presented t0 the

was

§ 15-3-101,

the Decedent’s property, and t0 substitute in their place, a personal

representative, Hillen, as the sole

The only

effect

of law under LC.

Supreme Court

for determination

invalidation 0f the holographic will and

on

that portion

“power 0f attorney

of the

transfers” 0f

Decedent’s property by the July 12, 2012 transfer, which transfer was nulliﬁed by the
magistrate.

By

that nulliﬁcation, Decedent’s property transferred

0f the now-nulliﬁed power of attorney authority under the theory
to

be returned

to the prior ownership,

and

that only

was

magistrate’s Rule 70(b) Order. See 164 Idaho at 471-73,

were presented, decided, 0r
effect

ripe for

any adjudication on

under that attempted exercise
it

was an

act

of “gifting”, was

the intended consequence of the

432 P.3d

at

20-22.

N0

other questions

that appeal concerning the extent

of the magistrate’s Rule 70(b) Order 0n the question 0f any determination 0f

Decedent’s property as provided by the Idaho

Although

it is

title

and

to the

UPC?

recognized the property was returned to Decedent, no issues were raised

2

The Rule 70(b) Order was entered for the purpose 0f restoring the prior ownership t0 the Decedent, not t0 convey
ownership t0 a personal representative. The Idaho Supreme Court neither addressed, nor decided, any issue other
than the invalidity 0f the 2013 power 0f attorney transfers Which had transferred Decedent’s propeITy t0 a limited

company and the invalidation 0f the Decedent’s Will. The Supreme Court’s primary reference t0 the Rule
0n the appeal was t0 use reference t0 that Order as a demarcation point in deﬁning those claims which
Order
70(b)
encompassed the time period in the scope of the bifurcated appeal. “This appeal follows the parties’ stipulation to
bifurcate the appeal to ﬁrst address any matters occurring up to the post-trial judgment under Rule 70(b) before
considering matters thereafter.” 164 Idaho at 466, 432 P.3d at 15.
liability
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nor decided 0n that appeal construing the Rule 70(b) Order,

was perceived
maliciously

be made upon the

t0

now

contended by Hillen.

decided to the effect

>

trust provisions

On

the

itself,

as the return t0 the

Decadent

0f the UPC, despite What

Supreme Court appeal no

issues

being

is

were raised or

that:

was made the sole “owner” of the Estate property, as opposed
granted a power and possession, in trust, for the beneﬁt 0f the Estate’s
provided by the UPC;
Hillen

t0 being
heirs, as

>

The “divestment” language 0f the Rule 70(b) Order was intended to accomplish
anything more than a mere transfer back to the Decadent those properties that
had been earlier subj ect to the power 0f attorney transfers;

>

Vernon K. Smith was divested of all of his interest in the property of the
which he received as a matter 0f law under I.C. § 15-3-101;

>

As

a result of the entry of the Rule 70(b) Order Hillen

any 0f the constraints, as otherwise

imposed

under the

was no longer
UPC, upon his

estate,

subject t0
actions as

a personal representative; and

>

As

a result 0f the entry 0f the Rule 70(b) Order Hillen

was

free t0

proceed With a

of the Estate property, Without reference t0 any necessity for the
who might have

full liquidation

disposition 0f that property in the interest of creditors and others

a legitimate interest in the administration 0f the Estate.

Considering the construction Hillen
this matter, as a

is

attempting to place

6,

15 (2018),

it is

no surprise

to this

Vernon K. Smith, have become hyper-attentive
allegations that he

is

the “sole

authorized to proceed with a

It

no

as Chapter 7

—

Court that Gibson, and his legal counsel,

about, and opposed to, Hillen’s malicious

owner” 0f Decedent’s property, and

full liquidation

that as a consequence,

he

is

of Decedent’s property in the same manner as

if

he

Bankruptcy Trustee.

remains undisputed

creditors

the Rule 70(b) Order in

consequence 0f the Supreme Court’s decision In re Estate omez'th, 164 Idaho

457, 466, 432 P.3d

were acting

upon

at the

either secured or

time 0f Victoria’s death 0n September 11, 2013, there were

unsecured — as Vernon resolved any and
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all

debts, liabilities

and

controversaries long before the death 0f the Decadent. There were no creditors for the beneﬁt 0f

Which Hillen would have been required
that

had been made by the decedent

there

was no alleged fraud of any

emerged

this

PR

in the course

federal estate taxes,

far cry

and

(or as

made on

—

other than the

his extended cadre

of actually setting aside any transfers

her behalf by use of Vernon’s POAS), as

creditors’ interests, as

obligation 0f the Decedent’s estate

churned by

t0 act for purposes

none

The only

existed. I.C. § 15-3-710.

payment of excessive

fees

and expenses

of attorneys churning legal fees — has been what

of Hillen’s controversial administration, and that has been the payment 0f

Which extent and amount was extensively disputed, but were paid

from the fabricated 9 Million stated

in Hillen’s

Motion T0

in full, a

Sell (C1. R. p. 73) as Hillen

declined t0 secure the proper farmland appraisals, causing need for Vernon to secure relevant
appraisals to protect his interests,

deemed

taxes have been fully paid, with

t0

be a Violation 0f the PR’S ﬁduciary duty. A11

n0 penalties

t0

estate

be assessed for the delay caused through

Hillen’s administration.

Gibson and Vernon,
Hillen’s

Motion

and given the

The

for partial

his counsel,

have vehemently opposed not only any

Judgment on the Pleadings, based upon

critical legal restraints

and propositions

sale,

but also

his false claim to ownership,

that included the following:

PR only has

limited authority to act 0n behalf of creditors, and persons interested
any power or authority t0 blatantly ignore, or t0 thwart, the express
provisions 0f the UPC concerning the rights 0f heirs arising out of intestate succession, Where
title and ownership ofa Decedent’s assets vests immediately in the heirs upon death.
1.

in the estate, Without

2.

That neither the lower Court, nor the Supreme Court can act in excess

to expand, the limited statutory authority granted a personal representative

of,

0r attempt

by the UPC, being

from which authority is granted by the Idaho Legislature.
3. The December, 2018 decision of the Supreme Court has binding precedential
only as arising out of issues actually raised and decided 0n that appeal.

the exclusive source

effect

Authoritv Of A PR T0 Act In Respect T0 A Decedent’s Propertv Is Limited t0 Those
Actions Necessary T0 Protect The Rights Of Creditors Or Other Interested Parties

Under §15-3-101,

the

UPC

speciﬁcally states “Estates immediately descend at death t0
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successors identiﬁed by any probated will, 0r t0 heirs if n0 Will

is

probated, subject to rights

Which may be implemented through administration.” See, “Ofﬁcial Comment” LC. §15-3-101,
subsection

(1),

ﬁnal sentence (underlined emphasis added); and as held in Hintz

v.

Black, 125

Idaho 655, 659, 873 P.2d 909, 913 (Ct.App.1994) (“[T]he assets were subject to recoupment by
the personal representative, if required in order t0 satisfv estate liabilities.

(Emphasis added). 125 Idaho
administration 0f the estate

at

659, 873 P.2d at 913.

— being

§15-3-709.”)

I.C.

Absent any need arising out 0f the

0f which there are none — the

the interests 0f creditors,

property 0f Decedent passes at the death 0f the decedent t0 devisees and heirs, as a matter 0f
law, and remains there pursuant t0 I.C. §15-3-101, subj ect to in-kind distribution.

§15-3-101

is

UPC

repetitively referenced within Chapter 3 provisions within the

address the powers 0f the personal representative.

See,

“Ofﬁcial

Which

Comment” §15-3-709

(“Section 3-101 provides for the devolution 0f title on death. Section 3-711 deﬁnes the status 0f
the personal representative with reference t0

unnecessary t0 discuss the
acquires”); “Ofﬁcial

and devisees
101

except

at the

to

‘title’

t0

‘title’

and ‘power’

in a

way

that should

(“Title t0 a decedent’s property passes to his heirs

time 0f his death. See Section 3-101. This section adds

how

it

decedent’s assets which his personal representative

Comment” §15-3-901

indicate

make

successors

may

establish

record

in

title

little

t0 Section 3-

absence

the

0f

administration”).

“Ofﬁcial

in kind.

It

Comment” §15-3-906

(“This section establishes a preference for distribution

directs a personal representative to

t0 convert assets t0 cash only

where there

make

is

distribution in kind

whenever

a special reason for doing

reasonable means for determining value 0f assets distributed in kind.

It is

101, 3-901 and this section that each residuary beneﬁciary’s basic right
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s0.

feasible

It

and

provides a

implicit in Section 3-

is

t0 his proportionate

share of each asset constituting the residue.”). (Emphasis added)

The “Ofﬁcial Comment”
between the ownership

interests

The personal
”

t0

LC. §15-3-711

0f the heirs and the

representative

is

states

most

clearly the intended relationship

trust responsibilities

of a

PR (Hillen):

given the broadest possible “power over

title.”

He

power concept eases the succession 0f assets
title,
Which are not possessed by the personal representative. Thus, if the power is unexercised prior
to its termination, its lapse clears the title 0f devisees and heirs. Purchasers from devisees 0r
heirs Who are “distributees” may be protected also by Section 3-910. The power over title of an
absolute owner is conceived to embrace all possible transactions Which might result in a
conveyance or encumbrance of assets, 0r in a change 0f rights of possession. The relationship
receives a “power,

because the

rather than

0f the personal representative t0 the estate is that 0f a trustee. Hence, personal creditors 0r
successors 0f a personal representative cannot avail themselves 0f his title t0 any greater extent
than is true generally 0f creditors and successors of trustees. Interested persons who are
apprehensive ofpossible misuse ofpower by a personal representative may secure themselves
by use 0f the devices implicit in the several sections 0f Parts 1 and 3 0f this Article. See
especially Sections 3-50], 3-605, 3-607 and 3-611.0fﬁcial Comment t0 I.C. §15-3-71 1.
(Emphasis added)
Idaho adopted the

UPC

and became effective

Idaho rule that a personal representative

which had been the law
See,

Laws 0f

codiﬁed

at

v.

executor

is

code in 1864.

the Territory 0f Idaho, First Sess., Probate Practice Act, § 116, pp. 345-46, as

LC.

§

15—410

the Idaho Probate Code, as

Lemp

never considered an “owner” 0f Decedent’s property,

in Idaho since the Territory’s ﬁrst adoption the probate

at the

time 0f

Probate Code (UPC) in 1971. See also

in,

is

in 1971, maintaining the then-existing

it

its

Lemp

repeal and the enactment of the Idaho

v.

Lemp, 32 Idaho 397, 184

existed prior to the adoption of the

Lemp, 32 Idaho 397, 401, 184

P. 222,

not the owner ofany part 0fthe estate.

trust for the parties entitled t0

it,

UPC,

223 (1919), held

P. 222, (1919),

the Idaho

that,

Uniform

Under

Supreme Court

“The administrator 0r

He, in his ofﬁcial character, only holds

it

in

subject t0 the purposes 0f administration.” (Emphasis added)

This “trust relationship” between the

PR

and the heirs 0f the Decedent’s property has

been carried forward Within the current provisions 0f the UPC, as

set out in the text

0f I.C. §15-

3-711 by use 0f the qualifying phrase, “in trust however,” within that statute and as further
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cemented

in the

the effect that,

See

e.g.,

unqualiﬁed declaration made in the “Ofﬁcial Comment”

“The relationship 0f the personal representative

Allen

t0 that

same section

t0 the estate is that

t0

0f a trustee.”

Shea, 105 Idaho 31, 35, 665 P.2d 1041, 1045 (1983) (“[T]he personal

v.

representative exercises control over the property 0f the estate, in

the close 0f administration 0f the estate.”

receive “possession”

— not

title

—

(italicized

t0 estate property.

emphasis in

Blake

v.

herﬁduciary capacity,

The

original)).

PR

until

can only

Blake, 69 Idaho 214, 221, 205

P.2d 495, 499-500 (1949).

By

Virtue 0f this well-established case law, the misplaced assertions 0f Hillen,

underlie his Motion for partial Judgment 0n the Pleadings,

is

the false proposition he

is

Which

“owner”

of Decedent’s property, a legal impossibility, and therefore he cannot meet the elements of an
ejectment action. The magistrate’s Rule 70(b) Order could never serve t0 oust an heir 0f his
statutory ownership rights in Decedent’s property,

and such an interpretation

is

egregious, if not

a bad-faith mis-statement 0f the law, and a clear misrepresentation as t0 the established

precedent 0f our Supreme Court, and since

it is

seen to be clearly erroneous, advanced either

maliciously, or perceived t0 be an act 0f gross negligence or misfeasance of the ﬁduciary

capacity, this

PR is

acting outside his ﬁduciary duty under the applicable

UPC

law, the uniform

Idaho authority that Hillen has been sworn to uphold.
Hillen does not possess the required ownership interest necessary to pursue any action
for ejectment of

Gibson from the small portion of the 520 acres he has continuously occupied

since 2004, and Hillen’s Motion,

court,

upon

the pleadings, should have been denied

by

the lower

and must be reversed on appeal.

Cannot Act, Nor Can He Be Authorized t0 Act Bv Court Order, In Excess Of The
Limited Authoritv Granted Under The UPC and Established bv Idaho Law
Hillen

Hillen

is

statutorily

bound by

the limitations
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Comment

to

LC. §15-3-703 constrains a Personal Representative’s

declaring that, “[A] personal representative’s authority

public agency

known

Code

as the Court. But, the

is

makes

is to

settlement and distribution 0f the estate by use 0f statutory
statutory directions.

See Sections 3-107 and 3-704 .....

”

by

it

clear that the personal

proceed With the administration,

powers and

“ownership”,

acting

is

entirely

in

excess

in

accordance with

(Emphasis added)

Gowen

Hillen’s complaint to eject Gibson from the small portion of the

alleging

statutory authority in

derived from appointment by the

also

representative, in spite 0f the source 0f his authority,

acts

Field property,

0f his statutorily-conferred authority,

perpetuating a falsehood with his erroneous claim that he “has been

made”

the “owner” 0f the

Decedent’s property, as the effect of the magistrate’s Rule 70(b) Order was never intended
divest the heirs

0f all statutorily-conferred

neither statutory

power nor jurisdictional

The question regarding a court

title t0

the Decedent’s properly.

authority to engage such a result

The magistrate had

by her Order.

acting in excess of statutorily-conferred authority has

been under serious consideration and previously addressed by the appellate court
Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372, 195 P.3d 731 (Ct.App.2008) Where that Court

in State

v.

stated:

[C]0urts and lawyers sometimes say that a court lacked jurisdiction

mean simply

t0

When

they

committed error because the action that was
taken did not comply with governing law. For example, our appellate courts have
referred t0 a lack of “jurisdiction” when perhaps more precisely meaning that a
motion or complaint was not timely ﬁled, that a condition precedent t0 the right to
really

ﬁle the action

that the court

was not

satisﬁed, or that governing statutes or court rules did not

authorize the particular decision
at

made by

the court. (citations omitted) 146 Idaho

375, 195 P.3d at 734 (parenthetical reference t0 “citations omitted,” added).

The Court

in

Armstrong found

Supreme Court’s decision

in

People

v.

further signiﬁcance With citing t0 the

American Contractors Indemnity

California

C0., 33 Ca1.4th 653, 16

Ca1.Rptr.3d 76, 93 P.3d 1020 (2004) which announced the well-established principle
court acts contrary t0 the authority conferred by statute,
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when a

0f its jurisdiction and

that action is rendered voidable,

and

The Idaho Supreme Court
982 n.3 (201

1)

may become

in State

acknowledged the decision

146 Idaho

void.

376, 195 P.3d at 735.

at

v.

Hartwig, 150 Idaho 326, 329 n.3, 246 P.3d 979,

in

Armstrong, and embraced the manner in Which the

Court differentiated between the concepts 0f a court’s jurisdiction and a court’s authority,
Without altering that formulation 0f Idaho law as addressed by the Court 0f Appeals.3

Idaho

Courts continued to authoritatively rely upon Armstrong and the Idaho Supreme Court’s

comment 0n Armstrong made
319 P.3d 497, 499

13, 15,

P.3d 132, 135 n.2

(Ct.

(Ct.

in

2011 in Hartwig supra. See

App. 2014) and State

e.g.,

State

v.

Vaughn, 156 Idaho

Steelsmith, 154 Idaho 577,

v.

580

n.2,

288

App. 2012).

Notwithstanding the magistrate’s language (in dereliction of the statutory declarations)
in the

Rule 70(b) Order, and the Idaho Supreme Court’s comment upon that Order (“In June

2017, the court entered a judgment pursuant to Idaho Rule 0f Civil Procedure 70(b),
vested

title t0 all

been appointed.”

0f Victoria’s real and personal property in the personal representative
164 Idaho

deceased,

title

to

and ownership of the property vested immediately

to a personal representative

liabilities,

is

that

it

only has the

and because Victoria was

to the prior owner, the Decedent,

title

showing of a necessity regarding

Who had

466, 432 P.3d at 15 (emphasis added», the only lawful

at

construction applicable t0 this otherwise statutorily baseless Order

intended effect of restoring

Lich

in the heirs,

and only upon

under the limitations imposed by authority granted

under the UPC, can a

PR

exercise those limited powers over the

vested interests 0f the heirs. In the absence 0f such a construction which must be construed to
restrict

and

limit the effect

0f the Rule 70(b) Order, the lower court

is

perpetuating an egregious

error 0f the magistrate, as applied in this matter as exceeding the grant 0f statutory

3

A decision of the Idaho

Supreme Court,

as issued

upon the same

Appeals, until superseded, are binding precedent upon

all

power and

question, and opinions of the Idaho Court 0f

lower Courts. State

842 P.2d 660, 665-66 (1992).
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v.

Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 986-87,

jurisdictional authority provided t0 a personal representative

under the UPC.

The Decision Of The Idaho Supreme Court, In Re Estate Omeith, Provides N0
T0 Support Hillen’s Actions
The question

raised

and presented by Hillen’s Motion

for partial

Authoritv

Judgment on the

Pleadings, raises the issue of “ownership”, as Hillen seeks afﬁrmation from the lower court, as a

consequence 0f the magistrate’s Rule 70(b) Order, and as a consequence 0f the subsequent
appeal taken to the Supreme Court, the

PR became

the sole lawful

property, and “any interest Vernon once had in the premises
in Hillen the current sole owner.”

Judgment and vested
5.4; C1.

R. 61-62)

N0

statute 0r case

This speciﬁc question, as
heirs

— Vernon

that title

and

and/or Joseph

it

— 0f

law supports

by

the

432 P.3d 6 (2018). Had

it

was divested by

See Partial Judgment

the Rule 70

Memo

that untenable position as a statement

at pp. 4-

of law.

concerns the effect of the Rule 70(b) Order, as divesting the
all interest

and

title

in the Decedent’s property,

interest entirely transferred t0 Hillen, as the

argued, or decided

owner 0f the Gowen Field

Supreme Court
been seen

t0

in

its

PR, was neither

raised,

and having

made an

decision In re Estate 0f Smith, 164 Idaho 457,

be in need of clarifying the controlling law, the Idaho

precedent cited above would have been entirely incorporated within the Decision, as there
other case authority to the contrary, thus rejecting such a bogus claim

asserted

by

the

issue,

now

is

no

being maliciously

PR regarding ownership.

In issuing

its

opinion, the

Supreme Court may have used inopportune language

(as

highlighted in the quotation from that opinion set out below) in even referring t0 the Rule 70(b)

Order, but in the context 0f the issues that were actually raised and decided 0n that appeal, that

4

Even though Hillen’s argument is directed solely at Vernon K. Smith, if Hillen is successful in his pursuit 0f that
argument, then the lower court’s decision Will have equal effect 0n the ownership interests 0f Joseph H. Smith, also
currently declared to be an intestate heir,

by

necessarily divesting his

title

and transferring

it

to the personal

representative for purposes 0f the PR’s pursuit of his ejectment action against Gibson, and as pursued further as

against others.
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inopportune language

Supreme Court’s
reference within

is

to

be treated as mere

recitation 0f the factual

its

The following,

dicta.

as included within the Idaho

and procedural background

is

the Court’s only express

opinion to the Rule 70(b) Order:

judgment pursuant

In June 2017, the court entered a

Procedure 70(b), Which vested
in the personal representative

Vernon appealed these

t0

Idaho Rule 0f Civil

0f Victoria’s real and personal property
had been appointed.

title t0 all

Who

and

decisions,

this

Court granted Joseph’s motion for

acceptance 0f appeal directly from the magistrate court pursuant t0 Idaho
Appellate Rule 44.

This appeal follows the parties’ stipulation t0 bifurcate the

ﬁrst address any matters occurring up t0 and including the post-trial
judgment under Rule 70(b) before considering any matters occurring thereafter.

appeal

t0

The personal

representative 0f the estate, Intervenor-Respondent

Noah

Hillen,

is

not participating in this portion 0f the appeal. 164 Idaho at 466, 432 P.3d at 15
(emphasis added).

The

PR would

issue in the appeal.

have been an interested party had the issue 0f vested

The

PR was

title

been made an

not participating because he had n0 interest in the two issues

presented 0n appeal—the transfers t0

VHS

and the validity 0f the Holographic Will. The PR’s

proposed interpretation 0f the magistrate Rule 70(b) Order, as constituting an actual transfer of
“title”

UPC.

from the

heirs to the

PR, would be

in excess

0f the statutory authority provided by the

immediately upon death of the

Title to a decedent’s property devolves to the heirs

decedent, subject only t0 possible subsequent divestment, if necessitated by the administration
for the

beneﬁt 0f creditors and

liabilities.

authority that permits a transfer of

title

I.C.

from the

There

§15-3-101.

heirs to then

is

no

statutory grant of

become vested With

the personal

representative 0f a decedent’s estate.

Court judgments and decrees are subject t0 the same rules 0f interpretation as
construction of contracts.

McKoon

v.

Hathaway, 146 Idaho 106, 109, 190 P.3d 925, 928 (2008).

A prominent rule 0f contract interpretation is that contracts must be interpreted in respect t0 the
then-existing law. Path t0 Health,

LLP

v.

Long, 161 Idaho 50, 57, 383 P.3d 1220, 1227 (2016)
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(“‘This Court has held that “it

every written contract.

,9”,

is

axiomatic that extant law

interpretation 0f an appellate decision in, Application

P.2d 528, 533 (1949) (“What the court
statutes as they then existed

.

.

.

.”);

and

in,

163, 174 P.2d 212, 213 (1946) (noting that an executor

law

.

.

.

.”).

The Idaho UPC,

omeith, supra,

expressly

made

a part 0f

applied

to

the

ofKaufman, 69 Idaho 297, 306-07, 206

said, therefore,

and applied,

written into and

This rule was

omitted).

(citations

is

must be taken

in connection With the

In re Anderton

’s

must

Estate, 67 Idaho 160,

act “in strict

compliance With the

as in effect at the time 0f the referenced appeal in,

Matter ofEstate

applies in the interpretation and application t0 both the magistrate’s Rule 70(b)

Order and the Supreme Court’s opinion on appeal.
Long-standing authority supports the interpretation of Idaho appellate decisions that
differentiates

between those issues

the Court, and other matters

that

were actually raised and

which were simply referred

Idaho 84, 88, 238 P. 534, 534 (1925) (“‘There

What

is

said in an opinion and What

is

is

that

were actually decided by

to in the decision.

Bashore

v.

Adolf, 41

a pronounced line 0f demarcation between

decided by

it.”

(citation omitted; italicized

added». See also, Idaho Schools For Equal Educational Opportunity

v.

emphasis

Evans, 123 Idaho 573,

586, 850 P.2d 724, 737 (1993) (McDeVitt, C.J., concurring and dissenting); North Side Canal
C0.

v.

Idaho Farms C0., 60 Idaho 748, 758, 96 Idaho 232, 235-36 (1939); and Stark

McLaughlin, 45 Idaho 112, 123, 261

P. 244,

v.

245 (1927).

This long-standing principle of interpretation as applied to Idaho appellate opinions, as

based upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Bashore

by Idaho’s U.S.

District

Court

in,

AMX Intern,

v.

Adolf, supra, has been recently applied

Battelle

Energy Alliance, 744 F.Supp.2d

U.S.,

454 F.Supp.2d 1066, 1072 (D.Idah0 2006)

itself has stated that its

opinions “must be considered and construed

1087, 1091-92 (D.Idah0 2010), and

(“The Idaho Supreme Court

Hash

Inc.

v.

v.
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in the light

0f the rule that they are authoritative only on the

facts

on which they are founded.

General expressions must be taken in connection With the case in Which those expressions are
used.

is

“There

is

decided by

a pronounced line of demarcation between what
(Citation 0mitted).’

it.”

Bashore

is

said in an opinion and what

Adolf, 41 Idaho 84, 238 P. 534 (1925)

v.

(emphasis in 0riginal).”).

Because the questions raised 0n the appeal In re Estate 0f Smith, 164 Idaho 457, 432
P.3d 6 (2018) only addressed the power of attorney transfers and the validity 0f the Will, there
is

n0 disposition

as t0

Whether the Decedent’s heirs had been divested of

their statutorily-

conferred ownership interests by the operation of that Rule 70 Order.

Because

that question

was

neither raised nor decided

0n

that appeal, the decision

0f the

Supreme Court has n0 binding precedent concerning the question raised upon Hillen’s Motion,
nor does that appellate decision establish “law 0f the case” for the purposes 0f Hillen’s Motion.

See

e.g.,

Smith

By and Through Smith

v.

Treasure Valley Seed Company, LLC, 164 Idaho 654,

657, 434 P.3d 1260, 1263 (2019).
In addition t0 the rules establishing the extent of a binding precedent, 0r the application

of the “law of the case” doctrine, neither res judicata, nor collateral estoppel, as arising out of
the recent appeal apply to the ownership issue raised

on Hillen’s Motion.

collateral estoppel only apply t0 “subsequent” litigation.

Maravilla

v.

Res judicata and

J.R. Simplot C0., 161

Idaho 455, 458, 387 P.3d 123, 126 (2016).
Collateral estoppel has

no preclusive

must be raised had been actually decided

effect

because the application requires the issue

in the prior litigation.

Brown

v.

State, Indus. Special

Indem. Fund, 138 Idaho 493, 496, 65 P.3d 515, 518 (2003) (“Collateral estoppel applies t0
issues that actually

and necessarily have been decided

in prior litigation”). Neither the question
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of the personal representative’s “ownership” 0f Decedent’s

nor the divestiture 0f the

assets,

Decedent’s heirs 0f ownership of the Decedent’s assets, was raised and actually decided as a

consequence of the
In the

opposed

t0 the

earlier appeal.

same

vein, this speciﬁc question as t0 ownership of Decedent’s assets

him under

ripe for adjudication until the personal representative actually

choose t0 advance such a false position as he
assets,

as

presumption the personal representative would perform his statutory functions

Within the conﬁnes of the possessory trust rights conferred upon

become

—

now

the

UPC —

did not

— and unexpectedly —

claims “actual ownership” 0f Decedent’s

egregiously in excess 0f his statutorily-conferred authority to engage this present

ejectment proceeding, and in excess of the magistrate’s jurisdiction 0r authority.

Res judicata does not bar the adjudication 0f claims
the prior proceeding.

Pocatello Hosp,

LLC

v.

that

were not

ripe for adjudication in

Quail Ridge Medical Investor, LLC, 157 Idaho

732, 740-41, 339 P.3d 1136, 1144-45 (2014); Bell Rapids Mut.
752, 753-54, 890 P.2d 338, 339-340 (1995); and Duthie

v.

Irr.

C0.

v.

Hausner, 126 Idaho

Lewiston Gun Club, 104 Idaho 751,

754, 663 P.2d 287, 290 (1983).

N0

accepted Idaho doctrine of prior adjudication, Whether

it

be rules for construction

and application of precedent, the law of the case doctrine, or the doctrines of res judicata or
collateral estoppel, establishes

actions

upon Which

on the Pleadings

any bar

t0 bringing this challenge t0 potentially ultra Vires

the personal representative has predicated his

Motion

for Partial

Judgment

in this matter.

Therefore, thefundamental issue that

must be addressed by this Court

is

whether Hillen has

the requisite standing t0 assert “ownership”, the fundamental element t0 bringing an

action.
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ej ectment

In the case 0f

Young

City

v.

ofKetchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104-105, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159-

1160, (2002) the Court noted the signiﬁcance andfundamental importance ofstanding:
“It is

a fundamental tenet of American Jurisprudence that a person Wishing

t0 invoke a court’s jurisdiction

question t0 be determined
doctrine 0f standing
noted, the doctrine

is

is

by

must have standing. Standing

this court

a preliminary

is

before reaching the merits 0f the case. The

As

a subcategory to justiciability.

has previously

this court

imprecise and difﬁcult t0 apply. Standingfocuses 0n the party

seeking reliefand not 0n the issues the party wishes t0 have adjudicated.
the

case

0r

controversy requirement

of standing,

a

litigant

T0

satisfy

must allege 0r

demonstrate an injury in fact and a substantial likelihood the relief requested will
prevent 0r redress the claimed injury. This requires a Showing ofa distinct palpable
[perceptible, plain, obvious, readily Visible, noticeable, patent, distinct, manifest]

injury

and

fairly traceable

casual connection between the claimed injury and the

challenged conduct.” (Emphasis by italic ours) See also Martin v. Camas County,
150 Idaho 508, 248 P.3d 1243 (201 1), where standing was again addressed by the

Idaho Supreme Court and reiterated in 201

Our Appellate Courts emphasized
Trust, 153 Idaho 425,

1.

fundamental issue in

McLean

v.

Cheyovich Family

283 P.3d 742 (2012), wherein thefundamental need for a

litigant to establish

this

and demonstrate standing before a claim 0r a defense can proceed.
,

It

stated:

“In order t0 satisfy the requirement of standing, the petitioner must allege 0r

demonstrate a distinct palpable injury in
challenged conduct, and

fact, that

the injury

is fairly

traceable t0 the

that there is a substantial likelihood that the judicial relief

requested Will prevent or redress the claimed injury”.

As

t0 the

ownership 0f a Decedent’s property, the Court determines the Legislature's intent

from the statutory language and ordinary meaning of the terms, as
Ina,

v.

it

was

Kechter, 137 Idaho 62, 64, 44 P.3d 1117, 1119 (2002), and in

Idaho 870, 380 P.3d 681 (2016), wherein the court

“The objective of

stated in Ag Servs. 0fAm.,

Hoﬂer

v.

Shappard, 160

stated:

statutory interpretation

is

to give effect to legislative intent.”

Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 471, 475, 163 P.3d 1183, 1187 (2007).

“When

State

v.

interpreting a statute, the

.” Williams v. Blue Cross
words 0f the statute.
ofldaho, 151 Idaho
“If
the statutory language is unambiguous, the clearly
515, 521, 260 P.3d 1186, 1192 (2011).
.” Idaho Youth Ranch, Inc. v. Ada
expressed intent 0f the legislative body must be given effect.
Cnty. Bd. oquualization, 157 Idaho 180, 184-85, 335 P.3d 25, 29-30 (2014) (internal quotations
omitted) (quoting St. Luke’s Reg’ l Med. Ctr., Ltd. v. Bd. 0fC0mm ’rs ofAda Cnly., 146 Idaho 753,
755, 203 P.3d 683, 685 (2009)). This Court does not have the authority t0 modify an unambiguous

Court begins With the

literal

.

.

.
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Verska

legislative enactment.

v.

502, 508 (201 1) (quoting Berry

v.

Saint Alphonsus Reg’

l

Med.

Ctr.,

151 Idaho 889, 895, 265 P.3d

Koehler, 84 Idaho 170, 177, 369 P.2d 1010, 1013 (1962)).

The October 2 (and October

3),

2019 Decision 0f the lower court resulted

in the grant

of

a writ of assistance t0 Hillen for the purpose of terminating the “occupation” by Gibson of the

Gowen

Gibson’s arguments, as made in support of his Motion to

Field property.

Amend

Judgment, are primarily directed to the respective legal rights and obligations 0f Hillen, as the
personal representative With limited powers, and of Vernon’s interest, as a Decedent’s 2/3rds

heir,

with

whom

Gibson has a venture arrangement since 2004, was presented

has preserved these issues.

The question concerning Whether

Gowen

ordering Gibson’s ejectment from the

been determined
Dist.

V

t0

be the sole owner of the

the lower court

Field property depends

Gowen

was

and

correct in

upon whether Hillen has

Field property. See

Ada County Highway

LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 179 P.3d 323

Total Success Investments,

t0 the court

(2008),

stating

“Ejectment requires proof 0f (1) ownership, (2) possession by the defendants, and (3) refusal 0f
the defendants to surrender possession, citing also to

Trust, 131

Indiviso, Inc.

v.

Mid—Mile Holding

Idaho 741, 745, 963 P.2d 1178, 1182 (1998)”

Therefore, Hillen has the

statute

Pro

initial

and the existing case law. He

and stiﬂed by Lemp

v.

burden

is

t0 establish his “ownership”,

which

is

negated by

a personal representative, a “ﬁduciary” under the law,

Lemp, supra, from owning any of the Decedent’s property. He cannot

escape the limitations and restrictions within the requirements of the

UPC

and n0 debts.

In the alternative, if Hillen, as the personal representative,

were

t0 secure the right t0

possession,

it

would then be

in trust

for the beneﬁt 0f the Estate creditors and heirs, and

Hillen’s exercise 0f his statutorily-conferred

upon him by the UPC,
fees created

by

the

as there are

PR

and

n0

his cadre

powers

is

constrained by the limitations imposed

creditors 0r remaining obligations

0f counsel.

Among
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is

the required

demonstration of the existence 0f an objective necessity for taking possession 0f the property
for the

beneﬁt 0f estate creditors and other interestedpersons (LC.

§

15-3-71

In the exercise

1).

of these powers under the UPC, Hillen remains subject to the issuance 0f restraining orders as
direct at his actions taken in excess

personally remains liable in

Once

again, there

were no

any necessity, even

if

and crucial element

0f his statutory authority (LC.

money damages

creditors

and

all

§

15-3-607), and he

for breach 0f his ﬁduciary duties (LC. § 15-3-712).

taxes were before satisﬁed.

He

cannot demonstrate

he were t0 escape his inability t0 establish “ownership”, the fundamental

must be

that

established, as a matter 0f law,

Which here

is

sorely lacking

under the statutes and case law.

The Lower Court’s Decision Is Internally Inconsistent If It Both Recognizes That Hillen Is
An “Owner” Of The Decedent’s Propertv As A Result Of The EntrV Of The Rule 700))
Order, And That He Also Remains Subiect T0 The Statutorv Obligations Of A Trustee, The
Existence Of Which Trust Obligations Are Not Consistent With A Declaration That Hillen Is
The Sole Owner Of Decedent’s Propertv

On

its

face, the only intended function to

be served by the issuance 0f the Rule 70(b)

Order in the magistrate court was the voidance of the transfer 0f Decedent’s assets and the
return t0 Decedent,

who

then being deceased went to the heirs under the

UPC. N0

ever raised, placed at issue, 0r actually decided concerning the matter

now

question

was

presented t0 the

lower court that the effect of that Rule 70(b) Order was t0 vest “actual” sole ownership of the
estate assets in the Personal Representative, Hillen,

intestate heir,

Vernon, of his

interest arose as a matter

clearly implicated

and correspondingly

interest in the property (2/3rds

of law under LC.

§ 15-3-101.

t0

is

completely liquidate the Estate of

Victoria H. Smith as if his duties as a personal representative under the

than his duties as a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee.

P.

an

ownership as a 2/3rds heir) which

The law of unintended consequences

by Hillen’s expressly-stated objective
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UPC

are

no

different

It

Partial

appears—but

remains unclear— the lower court’s decision 0n Hillen’s motion for

still

Judgment 0n the Pleadings

(for ejectment)

was ultimately based upon

the authority

granted t0 a personal representative by LC. § 15-3-711 (“[A] personal representative has the

same power over

the

title

power 0f

t0

the estate that an absolute

however, for the beneﬁt 0f the creditors and other interested

lower court’s decision 0n Hillen’s motion

Memorandum Decision

is

owner should have,

in the estate.”).

The

in trust

basis for the

expressly set out on page 6 of the

Amended

(C1. R. p. 134), stating:

Gibson also argues that a personal representative’s power is limited, and can be used
only “t0 the extent necessary for the administration of that property in the interests of creditors
and other interested persons.” (Def.’s Mem. Opp’n Pl.’s Mot. Partial J. Pleadings 11.) It is
true that a personal representative’s temporary

creditors

and others interested

power

is

held “in trust

in the estate.” I.C. § 15-3-71

1.

.

.

.

power

contrary t0 Gibson’s assertion, does not limit the personal representative’s
property.

Whether possession 0f propertv

is

beneﬁt 0f the

for the

This creates a ﬁduciary duty, but
t0 control the

“necessary for purposes 0f administration”

is left

conclusive evidence, in
of the personal representative, whose
for possession thereof, that the possession of the property by the
any action against the heir
personal representative is necessary for purposes 0f administration.” LC. § 15-3-709. 1n other
words, as the comment notes, an heir may be able t0 sue “for breach of ﬁduciary duty, but this
request “is

t0 the sole discretion

.

.

.

possibility should not interfere with the personal representative’s administrative authority

relates t0 possession 0f the estate.”

Id. cmt.

So even

if

Hillen might

somehow

Lit

Violate his

ﬁduciary duty t0 Vernon by ejecting Gibson, the proper course is for Vernon to sue Hillen for
breach of ﬁduciary duty. But Gibson has not claimed such relief, nor could he d0 so, as he is
not an heir to Victoria’s estate.

Amended Memorandum

Decision

at p.

6 (italicized/bold

emphasis in original; bold/underlined emphasis added).
Hillen’s

motion was predicated solely upon him being the “sole owner” 0f the

Decedent’s property, not upon any statutory right of “possession.”

The lower court

neither

expressly rejected, nor expressly adopted, the stated-ownership-basis for Hillen’s request for

ejectment of Gibson from the

Gowen Field property.

In opposing Hillen’s motion,

Gibson and Vernon took strong exception

court’s conclusion, as highlighted in the above-quoted excerpt

P.

lower

from the Amended Memorandum

Decision, that the existence 0f the statutory ﬁduciary duty imposed
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by

the

UPC

does not limit

the personal representative’s

completely liquidate the

power

t0 control estate property.

estate, is in direct

the preservation 0f estate property.

Hillen’s declared intention t0

contravention 0f the express

I.C. §

UPC

standards requiring

Because the personal representative

15-3-906.

only granted possession 0f the estate property — holding only a power over the
holding the actual

title itself

—

there

is

is

but not

title,

an inherent restraint imposed upon his actions as a result

of the statutorily-declared ﬁduciary duty he owes to the estate

heirs.

Hillen did not seek conﬁrmation of his status as the trustee of the Decedent’s property,

he instead requested a declaration, as based upon the Rule 70(b) Order, that he

owner 0f Decedent’s properly, and

t0 the exclusion

0f Vernon K. Smith.

is

the actual sole

Such an outcome

serves t0 eliminate Hillen’s statutorily-created trust relationship With the heirs, and as a

consequence, serves t0 also extinguish his ﬁduciary duty t0 the heirs, which cannot be allowed
to occur

under the

restraints

The speciﬁc

relief that Hillen requested

speciﬁcally opposed

Order, not ruled

and limited powers 0f the UPC.

—

is

upon by

the declaration

the

on

made by

this

motion — and the

relief that

Gibson

Hillen that the probate court’s Rule 70(b)

Supreme Court 0n appeal, has established Hillen

t0

be the sole and

absolute owner 0f the estate property, Which ownership eliminates any trust interest retained by
the heirs and as protected

by

the personal representative’s ﬁduciary duty to the heirs.

Hillen’s request exceeds the statutory authority, and in fact

the

statutorily-granted

§ 15-3-71

representative

by LC.

upon which

relied in rendering

it

over

authority

1.

a

Decedent’s

property

Although the lower court cited

its

Amended

Decision,

it is

is

substantially in excess of

provided
I.C. §

t0

a

personal

15-3-711 as the basis

not clear Whether the lower Court

accepted 0r rejected Hillen’s claim t0 absolute and sole ownership 0f Decedent’s property.
Hillen’s intentions

were unequivocally

stated

on the face 0f the memorandum he submitted
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t0

the lower court t0 support his motion for partial

expressly stated the basis for the relief he

The Rule 70 Judgment

is

was

unambiguous.

judgment on the ejectment claim,

in

which he

requesting:

It vests all right, title,

and

interest in the

Gowen

Propertv t0 Hillen. The Idaho Supreme Court afﬁrmed the Rule 70 Judgment following
Vernon’s appeal. In re Estate omez'th, 164 Idaho at 482, 432 P.3d at 31. Vernon asserts that
the Rule 70 Judgment has no effect because it somehow conﬂicts with his “vested” ownership
right in the

Vernon’s

Gowen

Defendant (through Vernon) claims
Property became “vested” pursuant t0 Idaho Code

Property as a 2/3 heir 0f the Estate.

partial interest in the

Gowen

Section 15-3-101 upon her death.

This argument lacks merit.
interests

First,

Section 15-3-101 does not mention permanently vesting

nor pre—emption 0f future orders 0r judgments.

Second, the Rule 70 Judgment

Gowen

Property “is free and clear 0f any lien,
claim or interest 0f the Claimants [which includes Vernon.]” The Rule 70 Judgment was,
expressly states that Hillen’s ownership 0f the

ﬁttingly, entered pursuant t0 Rule 70(b) 0f the Idaho Rules 0f Civil Procedure. That provision
allows courts t0 “enter a judgment divesting any party’s title and vesting it in others.” I.R.C.P.

anv interest Vernon once had in the premises was divested bV the Rule
70 Judgment and vested in Hillen. the current sole owner. Memorandum in Support 0f
70(b). Therefore,

Partial

Judgment,

pp 4-5

at

(bold/underlined

emphasis

added;

bracketed/

parenthetical

references in original).

There

is

a huge difference in outcome if the lower court granted Hillen’s requested relief
Virtue 0f the

by declaring him, by

Rule 70(b) Order,

t0

be the sole actual owner of the

Decedent’s property, t0 the exclusion of Vernon (and by extension, to the other

Whose

interests as heirs

under LC.

§

15-3-101 allegedly have been entirely divested as a result

0f the entry 0f that Rule 70(b) Ordens

In the normal course 0f events Hillen’s

exercised in trust under I.C. § 15-3-711 only permits
operation 0f law under I.C. § 15-3-101,

necessary

heir, Joseph),

him

t0 divest the heirs’

When such divestment

title,

“power”

as acquired

by

has been determined t0 be

t0 satisﬁz estate claims.

Under

I.C.

§

15-3-101,

title

t0 estate property passes t0 the heirs at the time

0f a

decedent’s death, as a matter 0f law, subject only t0 the possible subsequent divestiture if

5

The language used 0n

Nonetheless, if Hillen

was only directed at the interests associated with Vernon.
Decedent’s property, then there exists no other remaining

the face 0f the Rule 70(b) Order

is

now the

sole

owner of the

all

have passed to Joseph H. Smith, by operation of law under LC.
consequently Joseph’s interest as an heir also has been eliminated.
estate interest that could

Appellant’s Opening Brief

P.

43

§

15-3-101, and

necessary in the administration 0f the estate by the exercise of the power granted to the personal
representative

by

I.C. § 15-3-71 1.

probated will, or to heirs

if

n0

will

through administration.” Ofﬁcial

title,

(“Estates descend at death t0 successors identiﬁed

is

probated, subject to rights Which

Comment LC.

subject only to divestment of their

title

by

§ 15-3-101,

11

1).

The

by any

may be implemented

heirs obtain

and retain

the personal representative’s exercise 0f the §

15-3-711 power, as limited by a required determination that such divestment of the heir’s

ownership interest in estate property

is

necessary for the administration of the estate for the

beneﬁt ofcreditors 0r other interestedparties.

What

Hillen

ejectment claim

is

is

attempting to accomplish by his motion for partial judgment 0n the

reverse the existing statutory mandate, and in

the Decedent’s property vests in

him

its

place, provide that

title

(instead 0f the heirs), apparently subject only t0

t0

some

possible reconveyance t0 the heirs at the end 0f estate administration, apparently at his sole

discretion since the

If the

UPC has n0 provision addressing such irrational circumstances.

lower court has declared Hillen to be the sole owner of the estate property, in

conjunction With the divestment 0f Vernon’s entire interest in Decedent’s property, then the §

15-3-711 trust relationship has been effectively extinguished along With the associated right of
the heirs to bring their claims for a breach 0f ﬁduciary duty

by

Hillen.

If Hillen is

no longer

required t0 act only under the exercise of a statutorily-conferred power, but instead the actual
absolute sole owner of the property, then there no longer

neither

is

Vernon nor Joseph would have had any standing

any ﬁduciary

interest to protect,

and

t0 challenge Hillen’s actions as the

personal representative because their entire interest in the estate has been determined t0 have

been extinguished by the entry 0f the Rule 70(b) Order. This was never the intention of the
Order, as to be such

is

without statutory authority 0r the magistrate’s exercise 0f its jurisdiction.
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As based upon

the above-cited excerpt

from the lower court’s Amended Decision,

it

appears the lower court did not intend to eliminate Hillen’s trust relationship to the heirs, nor to
either extinguish or eliminate the right

of the heirs

t0 challenge Hillen’s actions as

being a

breach of his ﬁduciary duty that arises out of the statutorily-imposed trust relationship, but that
said, the

“titled

lower court could not grant Hillen’s request for ejectment, Without declaring him the

owner”, a fundamental element of any

ej ectment

action,

from doing, instead relying upon the statutory authority of I.C.

Which the lower court refrained
§ 15-3-71 1,

Hillen ’s requested relieﬁ as based upon the Rule 70(b) Order, that he

and not by granting

the sole actual

is

owner

0fDecedent’s property.

The Probate Court Had N0 Authoritv, BV Use Of The Rule 70(b) Order, T0 Completelv Oust
Vernon K. Smith’s Ownership Interest In Decedent’s Propertv, Including The Interest He
Obtained As A Matter Of Law Under I.C. $ 15-3-101
Even though

the

Supreme Court’s opinion did not address 0r decide any question

concerning the construction and application 0f the Rule 70(b) Order, the language 0f that Order

— on

its

face

— does not support

Decedent’s property.
property,

Which prior

power of

attorney.

Hillen’s contentions

it

conferred upon

him

sole ownership to the

Magistrate Copsey could only intend t0 restore to the Decedent that
t0 her death

had been transferred

to

VHS

Properties,

In issuing that Rule 70(b) Order, the transfers

LLC by the

made

use 0f a

to Hillen

were

conditioned upon the recognition 0f his capacity “as personal representative 0f the Estate.” This
conditional reference should

t0

conﬁrm

Hillen could only take possession, and as only authorized

exercise a “power” over that property, as consistent with the provisions 0f the

UPC

concerning the authority and powers of a personal representative.6

6
Rule 821 0f the Idaho Family Law Rules is the rule that corresponds t0 Idaho Civil Rule 70. The last sentence of
Rule 821 speciﬁcally addresses the issuance 0f an order for the transfer 0f “possession,” as opposed the Rule 70’s

upon a transfer 0f “title.” (“When any order 0r judgment is for the delivery of possession, the
Whose favor it is entered is entitled to a writ of execution or assistance upon application to the clerk”).

singular focus only

party in
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A personal
the limitations

representative, in his actions in the administration 0f an estate,

The Ofﬁcial Comment

imposed by the UPC.

t0 I.C.

§

is

bound by

15-3-703 notes the

speciﬁc statutory constraints placed upon a personal representative’s actions by declaring
“[A] personal representative’s authority
the public agency

known

as the Court.

But, the

is

that:

derived from appointment by

Code

also

makes

personal representative, in spite of the source 0f his authority,

is

it

clear that the

to

proceed With

the administration, settlement and distribution 0f the estate

powers and
”
704 .....
Hillen

is

in accordance with statutory directions.

by use of statutory
See Sections 3-107 and 3-

attempting to act in excess of his statutorily-conferred authority by falsely

claiming the effect of the Rule 70(b) Order was t0

make him

property, and t0 divest the heirs 0f all statutorily-conferred

Somewhat more problematic

is

title

the sole

“owner” 0f Decedent’s

in Decedent’s property.

the language that appears within the Rule 70(b) Order

concerning the divestment 0f the property interest 0f Vernon K. Smith.

On

page 2 of

that

Order, Magistrate Copsey referenced the scope 0f this divestment as extending to Vernon’s
capacity, “individually,

,9

‘6

as personal representative,” (which he never was) “as attorney-in—fact

or agent 0r ﬁduciary,” and “any other capacity.”

necessarily raises the question whether

interest as

an

intestate heir

it

The use 0f

was her

all-encompassing language

this

intention to entirely eliminate Vernon’s

0f the estate as established under LC.

§

15-3-101?

If

it

were, she

should face a Judicial Cannon 0f Ethics inquiry, as no Judge had authority t0 actually eliminate
the interest of an intestate heir derived under LC. § 15-3-101, and to intentionally do so should

be Viewed as a Violation of the Idaho Code 0f Judicial Conduct.
If this appellate

Court were

t0 accept Hillen’s

proposed construction 0f the Rule 70(b)

Although the family law rule has n0 application here, it is being cited for the proposition that a distinction between
“possession” and “title” has been recognized in other contexts. Even in the absence 0f corresponding “possession”
language in Rule 70, in this matter Judge Copsey’s Rule 70(b) Order must be construed as a conveyance of title t0
the estate — and not to Hillen individually — Which construction is consistent With the existing statutory restrictions
placed upon a personal representative’s exercise 0f only a “power” over the property of the estate. I.C. § 15-3-71 1.
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Order, t0 divest Vernon 0f his interest, then does Joseph H. Smith
the sole intestate heir of the estate?

Or

is it

to

— Vernon’s

brother

that Hillen’s sole

be construed

— become

ownership of

Decedent’s property necessarily operates to also eliminate Joseph’s intestate share in the estate?
7

Neither the magistrate

— nor any

— has

judicial ofﬁcer

the authority t0 eliminate an heir’s

any speciﬁc grant 0f statutory authority allowing such an action

intestate share Without

an outcome constitutes an absurd

result.

By

8

— such

analogy to the rules 0f contract construction, as to

be relied upon in the interpretation of court orders, no effect should be given t0 a court order
that

would lead

(1964).

t0 such

an absurd

The question 0f a court

result.

Schieche

v.

Pasco, 88 Idaho 36, 41, 395 P.2d 671, 673

acting in excess of statutorily-conferred authority

prominently addressed by Idaho’s Court 0f Appeals in State

P.3d 731

(Ct.

Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372, 195

v.

App. 2008) as cited and discussed 0n page 31 above, where

and addressed the issue where governing statutes
particular decision

Armstrong

made bv the

court.

146 Idaho

cited to the principle stated in

at

01'

195 P.3d

at 735. It is

by

statute,

it

that Court laid out

court rules did not authorize the

375, 195 P.3d at 734.

People

American Contractors Indemnity

v.

C0., 33 Cal.4th 653, 16 Ca1.Rptr.3d 76, 93 P.3d 1020 (2004) that

the authority conferred

was most

has acted in excess 0f

its

When

a court acts contrary t0

jurisdiction.

146 Idaho

at

376,

fundamentally irrational for Hillen t0 claim Magistrate Copsey intended

the Rule 70(b) Order t0 have the effect Hillen advocates, nor did the Magistrate have any

authority to enter an order to that effect, a Violation of the

request for relief in this action, as based

7

Vernon’s

upon

his

ICOJC.

Consequently, Hillen’s

misplaced construction of the Rule 70(b)

Victoria Converse, assigned her 1/3 intestate share t0 Vernon, such that he holds 2/3 share in the
and his brother Joseph holds a 1/3 interest under the current state 0f the probate proceedings. If J.
Copsey’s Rule 70(b) Order is so-construed, so as to eliminate Vernon’s intestate share in the estate, then as the sole
remaining intestate heir whose interest has been neither assigned nor expressly eliminated by court order, Joseph
allegedly would become the sole intestate heir 0f the estate, a most absurd result that never could have been J.
Copsey’s intended purpose in issuing the Rule 70(b) Order, assuming she adheres t0 the ICJC.
8
The “Slayer’s Act,” as codiﬁed at I.C. § 15-2-803, would constitute one such example of speciﬁc statutory
authority that permits the elimination 0f an intestate heir’s interest in an estate.
sister,

intestate estate
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Order in his complaint for ejectment, claiming he

the sole

is

owner ofDecedent’s property,

to

allow him t0 proceed With the entire liquidation of estate property, must be summarily rejected

by

this appellate court.

Furthermore, Hillen’s proposed construction of the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision

0f the

entirely inconsistent With the provisions

representative a “power” over estate property.

P. 222,

UPC

See

He, in his ofﬁcial character, only holds

Which only confer upon the personal

Lemp

e.g.,

223 (1919) (“The administrator 0r executor

v.

Lemp, 32 Idaho 397, 401, 184

not the owner of any part 0f the estate.

is

in trust for the parties entitled t0

it

is

it,

subject t0 the

purposes 0f administration.”).9 That case law remains the authority in Idaho.

Court judgments and decrees are subject t0 the same rules of interpretation that apply to
the construction 0f contracts.

(2008).

A

McKoon

v.

Hathaway, 146 Idaho 106, 109, 190 P.3d 925, 928

prominent rule 0f contract interpretation

respect t0 the then-existing law. Path t0 Health,

1227 (2016) (“‘This Court has held that
a part 0f every written contract.

,9”,

“it is

LLP v.

and applied,

.

.

.”);

and

.

.

.

.”).

Therefore, the

omeith, supra,
and

9

is

UPC,

written into and

made

ofKaufman, 69 Idaho 297, 306-07, 206

in,

163, 174 P.2d 212, 213 (1946) (noting that an executor

law

is

This rule was expressly applied to the

said, therefore,

.

in

Long, 161 Idaho 50, 57, 383 P.3d 1220,

(citations omitted).

P.2d 528, 533 (1949) (“What the court

must be interpreted

that contracts

axiomatic that extant law

interpretation 0f an appellate decision in, Application

statutes as they then existed

is

must be taken

in connection

In re Anderton

’s

must

with the

Estate, 67 Idaho 160,

act “in strict

compliance With the

as in effect at the time of the referenced appeal in, In

Re Estate

incorporated within and applies t0 the interpretation of the Rule 70(b) Order

t0 the interpretation

0f the Idaho Supreme Court’s opinion on appeal.

Although Lemp was decided under the 1864 Idaho Probate Code,
by Idaho’s 1971 adoption 0f the Uniform Probate Code.

this principle
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of law was not in any

way

altered

The Rule 70(b) Order must be
Which

statutes only confer

interpreted consistent with the applicable

upon a personal representative a “power” over

for the administration of the estate for the

§ 15-3-71

statutes,

when necessary

beneﬁt of creditors and other interested persons. LC.

1.

by the Idaho Supreme Court,

Hillen’s argument the Rule 70(b) Order, as referenced

made him

title,

UPC

sole

owner

to

completely liquidate Decedent’s assets

the actual issues raised and decided

by

the Idaho

is

Without merit in reference to

Supreme Court 0n appeal, or

0f the Rule 70(b) Order. Hillen’s arguments must be rejected by

the logical intend

this appellate court

and the

Certiﬁed Judgment vacated.

Whether Gibson

T0 An Award Of Costs, And Preserve The Issue Of Attornev

Is Entitled

Fees, Should Gibson Prevail

On This Appeal?

Should Gibson prevail 0n

Motion

for Partial

district court error in granting the

Judgment on the Pleadings, Gibson should be awarded

I.A.R. 40 and Butters

this

based upon the

this appeal,

v.

Valdez, 149 Idaho 764, 771, 241 P.3d 7, 14 (Ct.App.2010). Because

court has demonstrated in other cases a reluctance to

disposition

is

costs pursuant t0

reversed, Gibson

would request

attorney fees on appeal to be determined

by

this court reserve

the lower court

award fees When a summary
any disposition on the issue of

upon conclusion of trial, where a

prevailing party Will then be established. See Berrett v Clark County School District N0. 6], 165

Idaho 913, 454 P.3d 555 (2019), wherein the court stated:

“The School
decline t0

and Ryan Barrett both seek attorney

District

Whistleblower Act. Because

award attorney

this

opinion does not yet resolve

fees at this time. PoryQﬂio

Recovery Assocs.

Idaho 228, 235, 395 P.3d 1261, 1268 (2017). Instead,
then the

distn'ct

Ryan

fees

under the

Benett’s claim,
v.

we

MacDonald, 162

if either party ultimately prevails,

court may award that party attorney fees incurred in bringing this appeal.”

In Porfolio Recovery Assocs.

v.

MacDonald, 162 Idaho 228, 235, 395 P.3d 1261, 1268 (2017),

this court stated:

Appellant’s Opening Brief

P.

49

“MacDonald requests an award of attorney's fees 0n appeal pumuant t0 Idaho Code section
12-1200), Which allows reasonable attorney's fees t0 the prevailing party. Because the case
is not yet resolved, there is no prevailing parry. Where there is no present prevailing party,
this

Court has refused t0 award attorney's

P.3d 465, 469 (2005). IfMacDonald

is

fees.

may award him attorney's fees for this appea
V.

Howard v.

Perry, 141 Idaho 139, 143, 106

ultimately the prevailing patty, then the

trial

court

.”

CONCLUSION

This case should be remanded to the Distn'ct Court, with instructions to vacate Judgment
entered

upon the Pleadings,

had no standing,

as Hillen

t0 assert

he

is

the exclusive titled and

vested owner of Decedent’s property, and to grant his motion serves to impose irreparable
to the real party(s) that are the titled

hann

and vested owners of the Decedent’s property, and a

miscarriage of justice by the denial 0f due process that wrongfully dispossesses Gibson 0f a

property interest he has held lawfully and with unfettered authorization from the Decedent and

Vernon since 2004, and following

Victoria’s death,

now

With the continuing approval and

request of the 2/3““ heir t0 the property ownership, seeking to preserve and maintain the

property for the best interests of the heirs.
Respectfully submitted this

15‘

day of June, 2020.
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